



Inevitable Imbalance:                                                            
Why FTC v. Actavis Was Inadequate to Solve the 
Reverse Payment Settlement Problem and Proposing a 
New Amendment to the Hatch–Waxman Act 
Rachel A. Lewis* 
The law regarding reverse payment settlements is anything but set-
tled. Reverse payment settlements are settlements that occur during a 
patent infringement litigation in which a pharmaceutical patent holder 
pays a generic drug producer to not infringe on the pharmaceutical pa-
tent.1 Despite the recent decision by the United States Supreme Court in 
FTC v. Actavis, Inc.,2 there are still unanswered questions about how the 
“full rule of reason” analysis3 will be applied to reverse payment settle-
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 1. FTC v. Watson Pharm., Inc., 677 F.3d 1298, 1301 (11th Cir. 2012). Other names for reverse 
payment settlements include “pay for delay” settlements and “exclusion payments.” See, e.g., Robert 
A. Skitol & Kenneth M. Vorrasi, FTC v. Actavis: Inviting a More Nimble Rule of Reason, 
ANTITRUST, Fall 2013, at 29, 51; Brief Amici Curiae of 118 Law, Economics, and Business Profes-
sors et al. in Support of Petitioners at 2, FTC v. Watson Pharm., Inc., 677 F.3d 1298 (11th Cir. 2012) 
(No. 12-416) [hereinafter Amici Curiae Brief in Support of FTC], available at 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/supreme_court_preview/briefs-v2/12-416 
_pet_amcu_118-prof-etal.authcheckdam.pdf. 
 2. 133 S. Ct. 2223 (2013). This case was decided on June 17, 2013. Id. 
 3. The full rule of reason is the basic way to analyze antitrust suits. 58 C.J.S. Monopolies § 57 
(2006). Explaining the rule of reason analysis further is beyond the scope of this Comment; howev-
er, a basic statement of the full rule of reason can be summarized as follows: 
Under the Sherman Anti-Trust Act . . . the rule of reason . . . requires the fact finder to 
decide whether under all the circumstances the restrictive practice imposes an unreasona-
ble restraint on competition. It requires a weighing of the relevant circumstances to de-
cide whether the practice constitutes such an unreasonable restraint. The inquiry mandat-
ed by the rule is whether the agreement is one that promotes competition or whether it 
suppresses competition. A restraint is unreasonable if it has an adverse impact on compe-
tition and cannot be justified as a pro-competitive measure. A combination is not legal 
merely because some persons other than the members of the combination have profited 
by its operation. 
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ments.4 Now, another legislative amendment regarding reverse payment 
settlements has been proposed in Congress,5 and the Actavis decision 
fails to address both public and private concerns focused on by legal 
scholarship.6 
To contextualize the issues underlying reverse payment settlements, 
FTC v. Watson Pharmaceuticals, Inc.7—the Eleventh Circuit decision 
reversed in Actavis—provides an instructive example. In Watson, a 
pharmaceutical patent holder sued two generic drug companies for in-
fringing on its patent rights.8 Responsively, the two generic drug produc-
ers challenged the validity9 of the pharmaceutical patent.10 Before the 
court entered judgment regarding the patent’s validity, the patent holder 
and generic drug producers settled.11 Thus, the parties avoided establish-
ing a final judgment about the validity of the underlying patent.12 By the 
terms of the settlement, the generic drug producers agreed to dismiss the 
suit, not produce the patented product until a certain date, and promote 
the patented product for the patent holder.13 In exchange, the patent hold-
er agreed to pay the generic producers between $72 million and $360 
million over the course of six years.14 The patent holder did this to pro-
tect its own profits, which were estimated at $125 million per year ($750 
million over six years).15 The size of the settlement payments by the pa-
tent holder has been criticized as anticompetitive because the patent 
holder is spending such a large portion of its yearly profits to avoid a 
                                                                                                                                     
Id. (internal citations omitted). 
 4. The holding was that “the Eleventh Circuit should have allowed the FTC’s lawsuit to pro-
ceed,” not that reverse payment settlements are per se valid or invalid. Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2227. 
 5. S. 214, 113th Cong. (1st Sess. 2013). 
 6. See, e.g., Amici Curiae Brief in Support of FTC, supra note 1, at 1–2 (suggesting that they 
are seeking the right balance between innovation and competition when rejecting the scope of the 
patent test). 
 7. Watson, 677 F.3d 1298. 
 8. Id. at 1305. 
 9. Whether a patent is valid depends on many factors, which are not the focus of this Com-
ment. See generally 35 U.S.C. §§ 101–103 (2012) (discussing respectively patentable subject matter, 
novelty, and non-obviousness requirements). Suffice it to say that if a patent dispute is litigated to a 
final judgment and the patent is found to be invalid, then the patent holder could no longer enforce 
the patent exclusivity. 
 10. Watson, 677 F.3d at 1305. 
 11. Id. 
 12. Id. 
 13. Id. 
 14. Id. 
 15. Id. 
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judicial decision regarding its patent’s validity, which would potentially 
make the market more competitive.16 
These settlements have been called antitrust violations by the Fed-
eral Trade Commission (FTC)17 and legal scholarship;18 meanwhile, the 
majority of the federal courts found the settlements near per se legal be-
cause the settlement was within the rights of the patent holder to negoti-
ate prior to Actavis.19 Reverse settlement payments occur in part because 
of the complex regulatory framework of the Drug Price Competition and 
Patent Restoration Act (the Hatch–Waxman Act or the Act).20 
This Comment argues that despite the outcome in Actavis, the 
structure of the Hatch–Waxman Act will create repeated conflicts be-
tween antitrust law and patent law because it attempts to use private ac-
tors as proxies for the interests of externalities. Thus, the only long-term 
solution is to pass a legislative amendment and have the government as-
sume responsibility for litigating the validity of weak patents in the re-
verse-payment settlement context.21 
To support this thesis, Part I sets out the background of the unique 
regulatory scheme created in the Hatch–Waxman Act while also locating 
the stakeholders in a real world context. Part II discusses how pharma-
ceutical patent holders have responded to litigation stemming from the 
Act and the range of agreements that have arisen between patent holders 
and generic producers. Part III discusses the judicial history of the vari-
ous reverse-payment settlement cases and explains why the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Actavis does not resolve the anticompetitive potential 
of reverse-payment settlement. Part IV discusses previously proposed 
reverse-payment settlement legislation and why such legislation would 
                                                            
 16. See Einer Elhauge & Alex Krueger, Solving the Patent Settlement Puzzle, 91 TEX. L. REV. 
283, 288 (2012) (stating that “even though patent holders get a presumption of patent validity, they 
lose 48%–73% of patent cases . . . .”). 
 17. Richard A. Feinstein, Anticompetitive Pay-for-Delay Settlements in the Pharmaceutical 
Industry: Why Consumers and the Federal Government Are Paying Too Much for Prescription 
Drugs, FED. TRADE COMMISSION (June 3, 2009), http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/ 
public_statements/prepared-statement-federal-trade-commission-anticompetitive-pay-delay-settleme 
nts-pharmaceutical/p859910payfordelay.pdf (prepared statement before the Subcommittee on Courts 
and Competition Policy of the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on the Judiciary). 
 18. See, e.g., Christopher M. Holman, Do Reverse Payment Settlements Violate the Antitrust 
Laws?, 23 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 489, 491–92 (2007). 
 19. Compare Watson, 677 F.3d at 1308–09 (supporting the scope of the patent test which pre-
sumes patent validity), with In re K-Dur Antitrust Litig., 686 F.3d 197, 215 (3d Cir. 2012) (only 
circuit court case finding that antitrust violations occurred despite the reverse-payment settlement 
being within the exclusionary scope of the patent). 
 20. Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984 (Hatch–Waxman Act), 
35 U.S.C. § 156 (codified in part in Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. § 355 (2012)). 
 21. See infra Part V.B for specific language of the proposed amendment. 
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fail to solve the underlying issue of patent validity. Part V proposes (A) 
that the incentive structure of the Hatch–Waxman Act is inherently 
flawed; and (B) that a government body, potentially the FTC, should be 
given standing by Congress to directly litigate weak pharmaceutical pa-
tents after a reverse-payment settlement occurs. Part VI offers a brief 
conclusion. 
I. THE HATCH–WAXMAN ACT: THEORETICAL FORMATION AND 
UNANTICIPATED RESULTS 
The Hatch–Waxman Act is, in part, an attempt to incentivize the 
discovery and invalidation of weak drug patents22—those issued patents 
that may not be valid.23 This Part discusses both the formation as well as 
the technical mechanisms of the Act. 
A. Formation of the Hatch–Waxman Act 
When it comes to pharmaceutical patent validity, consumers, the 
government, and generic producers have a naturally aligned interest in 
invalidation. When a generic drug enters the market because a drug is no 
longer patented, the drug price drops by approximately 80%.24 The con-
sumer has an interest in low-cost drugs.25 The government, while trying 
to balance the public and private interests,26 has favored the public good 
                                                            
 22. Although the Act is generally characterized as a balance between the interests of generic 
producers and patent holders, the former legislative scheme was highly favorable to the patent hold-
ers, and the pharmaceutical patent holder lobby group objected to the patent act changes throughout 
the Act’s drafting and enactment. Compare H.R. REP. No. 98-857(II) (1984) (the statement by the 
patent holder lobby group: “a group of drug companies opposed to the legislation in its current form 
articulated its reservations. They argue that the bill will hamper innovation and research, create 
unnecessary litigation and unconstitutionally take property from patent owners.”) (original capitali-
zation omitted), with id. (“Congressman Waxman engaged in extensive negotiations with interested 
parties. The primary participants were the generic pharmaceutical industry associations (GPIA) and 
the pharmaceutical manufacturers association (PMA).”) (original capitalization omitted). 
 23 . See Joseph Farrell & Carl Shapiro, How Strong Are Weak Patents, 98 AM. ECON. 
REV. 1347 (2008). As Farrell and Shapiro theorize, “The bigger issue [than blatantly invalid pa-
tents], . . . concerns patents that are not clearly invalid, but are weak—they may well be invalid, but 
nobody knows for sure without conclusive litigation.” Id. (emphasis in original). 
 24. “Generally hundreds of millions and, not infrequently, billions of dollars are at stake for the 
brand company. If the generic company successfully defends against the infringement claim, compe-
tition occurs. The generic will quickly take as much as 80 percent of the brand’s prescriptions in a 
matter of months.” Michael Kades, Whistling Past the Graveyard: The Problem with the Per Se 
Legality Treatment of Pay-for-Delay Settlements, 5 COMPETITION POL’Y INT’L 143, 147 (2009). 
 25. One commentator noted, “On four blockbusters alone, consumers are expected to save over 
16 billion dollars because of generic entry prior to patent expiration.” Id. 
 26. See Competition in the Pharmaceutical Marketplace: Antitrust Implication of Patent Set-
tlements: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th Cong. 10 (2001) [hereinafter Senate 
Hearing]. 
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over the interests of the private parties in the pharmaceutical industry.27 
Also, the government itself is a customer of pharmaceutical drugs, which 
suggests that it has an interest in patent invalidity.28 Finally, the generic 
drug producer’s interests are financial. The generic drug companies make 
money by selling off-patent drugs to as many consumers as possible.29 
By doing this, the generic companies make their profits by avoiding re-
search and development costs—which exponentially increase overhead 
costs—by selling formerly patented products.30 
When drafting the Hatch–Waxman Act, Congress seemingly as-
sumed that the consumer, governmental, and generic interests would re-
main aligned. So Congress had a stroke of brilliance: incentivize generic 
companies to challenge pharmaceutical patent validity,31 and the con-
sumers will vicariously benefit.32 Thus, the theoretical negotiation of the 
Hatch–Waxman Act seemed to leave all of the stakeholders happy. All of 
the stakeholders, that is, except the pharmaceutical patent holders.33 
Pharmaceutical patent holders were in a bind. For years the phar-
maceutical companies had borne the almost prohibitively high costs of 
pioneer drug development.34 The discovery of a new drug was costly and 
                                                                                                                                     
[The Act was] intended to balance two important public policy goals. First, drug manu-
facturers need meaningful market protection incentives to encourage the development of 
valuable new drugs. Second, once the statutory patent protection and market exclusivity 
for these new drugs has expired, the public benefits from the rapid availability of lower-
price generic versions of the innovator drug. 
Id. (statement of Sen. Hatch, Chairman, S. Comm. on the Judiciary).  
 27. See H.R. REP. No. 98-857(II) (1984), supra note 22 and accompanying text. 
 28. In one FTC report on the costs of reverse payment settlements, the FTC points out that 
“[t]he federal government is particularly affected: Federal dollars accounted for an estimated 31 
percent of the $235 billion spent on prescription drugs in 2008, and that share is expected to rise to 
40 percent by 2018.” Feinstein, supra note 17, at 3. 
 29. The generic producers avoid huge costs by not innovating new drugs. In one year, pharma-
ceutical patent holders spent a combined $50 billion investment in life science research. Senate 
Hearing, supra note 26, at 10. 
 30. Id. 
 31. See generally 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii)(IV) (2013) (companies could file drug applica-
tions based on the invalidity of a currently patented drug). 
 32. By 2009, after the enactment of the Hatch–Waxman Act, consumers had saved an estimat-
ed $734 billion, at an estimated rate of $121 billion a year, which outstripped the original estimate of 
$1 billion in savings expected over the course of ten years. S. Res. 287, 111th Cong. (1st Sess. 2009) 
(resolution introduced in the Senate). 
 33. “A group of drug companies opposed to the legislation in its current form articulated its 
reservations. They argue that the bill will hamper innovation and research, create unnecessary litiga-
tion and unconstitutionally take property from patent owners.” H.R. REP. No. 98–857(II) (1984) 
(original capitalization omitted); see also Senate Hearing, supra note 26, at 10 (statement of Sen. 
Hatch, Chairman, S. Comm. on the Judiciary). 
 34. Estimates of the cost of research and development for each new drug compound to the 
value on the day of market approval was roughly $194 million in 1990; other estimates have been as 
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risky, but the patent holders continued to fund research because even one 
pharmaceutical patent was incredibly lucrative.35 The lucrative nature of 
the business model was directly linked to the patent monopoly.36 These 
monopolies were so lucrative that the pharmaceutical companies put in 
incredible lobbying efforts to extend and take advantage of the former 
legislative scheme.37 Prior to the Hatch–Waxman Act, even after drug 
patents naturally expired, generic companies would not produce the off-
patent drugs because the companies had to first duplicate all of the FDA 
tests.38 The Hatch–Waxman Act changed all of that. 
Part of the negotiation of the Act included allowing the generic 
producers to piggy-back on the FDA testing done by the pharmaceutical 
patent holders.39 The Act also incentivizes generic companies to file ap-
plications to produce drugs because it gives the first generic company a 
short exclusivity period.40 Thus, Congress made filing easier and cheap-
er, and enticed generic companies to take advantage of the deal. And it 
succeeded; the Act revolutionized the landscape of the pharmaceutical 
drug market.41 
B. The Technical Mechanisms of the Act 
The most pro-generic change under the Hatch–Waxman Act was 
the creation of the abbreviated new drug application (ANDA).42 Part of 
the incredible expense of patenting a new drug is the required new drug 
application (NDA).43 In NDAs, the pharmaceutical patent holders have to 
show that the drugs meet the requirements of the FDA through drug test-
                                                                                                                                     
high as $802 million per drug. Shannon U. Han, Note, Pay-to-Delay Settlements: The Circuit-
Splitting Headache Plaguing Big Pharma, 15 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 913, 919 n. 34 (2013). 
 35. Typical profit margins range from 90%–95%. Barbara Martinez & Jacob Goldstein, Big 
Pharma Faces Grim Prognosis: Industry Fails to Find New Drugs to Replace Wonders Like Lipitor, 
WALL ST. J., Dec. 6, 2007, at A1. 
 36. See Jessie Cheng, Note, An Antitrust Analysis of Product Hopping in the Pharmaceutical 
Industry, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1471, 1476 n. 28 (2008). 
 37. See H.R. REP. No. 98-857(II) (1984) (“A group of drug companies opposed to the legisla-
tion in its current form articulated its reservations. They argue that the bill will hamper innovation 
and research, create unnecessary litigation and unconstitutionally take property from patent own-
ers.”) (original capitalization omitted).  
 38. The Hatch–Waxman Act was negotiated because of “[t]he inability of generics to obtain 
approval for these post-1962 drugs without enormous expenditures of money for duplicative tests.” 
Id. (original capitalization omitted). 
 39. Holman, supra note 18, at 510–11. 
 40. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv) (2013). 
 41. See generally S. Res. 287, 111th Cong. (1st Sess. 2009) (describing over $700 billion in 
savings by American consumers since the enactment of the Hatch–Waxman Act, which far exceeded 
the expected savings of $1 billion annually). 
 42. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j) (2012). 
 43. See id. § 355(b). 
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ing.44 Under the old system, the generic drug producers who wanted to 
sell an off-patent drug would have to duplicate these tests.45 After the 
passage of the Act, generic producers are able to file an ANDA instead.46 
The ANDA simply verifies that the drug to be produced is a bioequiva-
lent47 to the previously approved drug.48 This abbreviated process signif-
icantly reduces costs for the generic producers and significantly raises 
competition for the original patent holder.49 
When filing an ANDA, the generic drug producer must cite one of 
four bases laid out in the Act for its application.50 Paragraph IV—the 
fourth basis—justifies the application on the fact that the patented drug is 
“invalid or will not be infringed.”51 All reverse-payment settlement liti-
gation is an outgrowth of Paragraph IV litigation. 52 Paragraph IV re-
quires that the applicant generic drug producers include information 
about the bioequivalence of their ANDA to a patent holder’s NDA.53 The 
bioequivalence requirement leads to controversy because if the generic 
company successfully applies under Paragraph IV, the patent will be-
come invalid earlier than the date of patent expiration, and the exclusivi-
ty rights of the patent holder will end.54 
Several administrative steps take place before the patent is declared 
invalid. First, the patent holder is sent notice of the ANDA55 because, 
technically, an ANDA is an act of patent infringement.56 Then the patent 
holder has forty-five days to initiate an infringement suit against the ge-
                                                            
 44. See id. 
 45. H.R. REP. No. 98-857(II) (1984). 
 46. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j) (2012). 
 47. Bio-equivalent essentially means that there is not a change to the chemical structure of the 
drug’s active ingredient. See Holman, supra note 18, at 491–92. 
 48. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A). 
 49. Cheng, supra note 36, at 1476 n. 30. 
 50. The four bases are “(I) that such patent information has not been filed, (II) that such patent 
has expired, (III) of the date on which such patent will expire, or (IV) that such patent is invalid or 
will not be infringed by the manufacture, use, or sale of the new drug for which the application is 
submitted.” 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii)(I)–(IV). 
 51. Id. 
 52. “Nearly all reverse payment settlements stem from patent-infringement litigation where the 
generic entrant certifies that the patent is either invalid or not infringed. This is known as paragraph 
IV certification.” Henry N. Butler & Jeffrey Paul Jarosch, Policy Reversal on Reverse Payments: 
Why Courts Should Not Follow the New DOJ Position on Reverse-Payment Settlements of Pharma-
ceutical Patent Litigation, 96 IOWA L. REV. 57, 64 (2010); see also Holman, supra note 18, at 494 
(2007); 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii)(IV) (2012). 
 53. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii). 
 54. See id. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv). 
 55. Id. § 355(j)(2)(B)(iii)(I). 
 56. 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(2)(A) (2012). 
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neric producer, or it will passively concede validity.57 Assuming that the 
patent holder initiates an infringement suit, an automatic stay is initiated, 
which stops the ANDA from being approved until either (a) thirty 
months pass; or (b) the court hearing the patent challenge finds the patent 
either invalid or not infringed.58 
These mechanisms essentially require (1) the generic producer to 
constructively infringe on the patent; (2) the patent holder to file suit if it 
wants to retain its monopoly; and (3) the patent holder to either litigate, 
settle, or lose its patent monopoly. The cost of litigation is high for both 
parties, and the risk of patent invalidity is incredibly costly for patent 
holders.59 The risk of infringement is similarly high for generic produc-
ers, and the value of the patent monopoly far outmatches the cost of set-
tling the suit.60 
In fact, pharmaceutical patents are so valuable that patent holders 
can settle Paragraph IV litigation for more than the generic producers 
would make by actually producing the drug.61 Some studies even indicate 
that patent holders could pay settlements to over five generic challengers 
and still make a profit.62 Furthermore, this level of profit would make it 
economically illogical and bad business for a patent holder to litigate 
even strong patents.63 
On the other hand, if the generic producer’s Paragraph IV ANDA 
was approved by the FDA—either through litigation or because the pa-
                                                            
 57. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(B)(iii). 
 58. Id. § 355(j)(2)(B)(iii)(I). 
 59. See supra note 24. 
 60. “Left to their own devices, both the incumbent monopolist and the entrant are better off if 
they eliminate competition and share the monopoly profits.” Kades, supra note 24, at 148. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. 
Assume that the brand product has yearly sales of one billion dollars. A single generic, 
assuming it takes 80 percent of the brand’s sales and prices at a 30 percent discount, will 
earn roughly 560 million dollars in revenue. In contrast, if five generics enter, they drive 
the price down to 33 percent of the brand price. The total generic revenue will fall to 267 
million dollars. In other words, if the brand has to pay the full revenue of the generics, it 
would actually cost more than twice as much to buy off one generic than five generics. 
Id. 
 63. Id. at 150. 
The important point is that, whether competition is certain . . . the patent is weak . . . or 
the patent is strong . . . [,] the brand and the generic are better off preserving the monopo-
ly by having the branded firm pay the generic company not to enter. . . . The strength of 
the patent—how likely it is to block competition—would not determine when there is 
competition; rather, the profits the branded firm earns by eliminating the threat of generic 
competition and the brand’s willingness to share those profits determines when competi-
tion would occur. 
Id.  
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tent holder did not challenge the application—the generic producer 
would get a 180-day exclusivity period during which it would be the only 
competitor for the patent holder.64 Prior to the expiration of this exclusiv-
ity period, other generic producers’ applications would not be approved, 
thus giving the generic producer a short monopoly where it could charge 
a super-competitive price.65 Furthermore, the 180-day period would not 
be triggered until the first-to-file generic drug producer began commer-
cial marketing.66 This strategy would allow the first-to-file generic pro-
ducer to prevent other generic producers from entering the market.67 All 
the first-to-file generic company would have to do is never begin com-
mercial marketing.68  This practice, called “bottlenecking,” meant that 
patent holders and first-to-file generic producers negotiated bottleneck-
ing deals to extend the patent monopoly beyond its legal scope.69 Bottle-
necking deals, the first form of reverse payment settlements, were subse-
quently found to be per se illegal under antitrust law by the courts.70 
Thus, eliminating the provision that allows only one generic producer to 
gain first-to-file exclusivity would not help invalidate weak patents.71 
II. THE RANGE OF PARAGRAPH IV REVERSE-PAYMENT                   
SETTLEMENT AGREEMENTS 
After pharmaceutical patent holders failed to lobby to keep the 
Hatch–Waxman Act from being enacted, they tried to figure out how to 
regain lost ground under the new regulatory scheme. The pharmaceutical 
patent holders acted in their own profit maximizing self-interest—as is 
expected of rational actors in a competitive economic system—to find 
ways to make the new law beneficial to their businesses. One solution 
created by the patent holders was to make reverse payment settlements 
                                                            
 64. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv) (2012). 
 65. Id. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv). 
 66. Id. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv). 
 67. Seiko F. Okada, In re K-Dur Antitrust Litigation: Pharmaceutical Reverse Payment Settle-
ments Go Beyond the “Scope of the Patent,” 14 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 303, 312 (2012) (“Accordingly, a 
subsequent filer of an ANDA is prohibited from marketing its generic drug until after the first-filer’s 
exclusivity period has ended. Therefore, the settling first-filer and innovator could effectively ‘bot-
tleneck’ the market by preventing any other generic from selling the drug.”). 
 68. Id. 
 69 . Erica N. Andersen, Note, Schering the Market: Analyzing the Debate over Reverse-
Payment Settlements in the Wake of the Medicare Modernization Act of 2003 and In re Tamoxifen 
Citrate Litigation, 93 IOWA L. REV. 1015, 1022 (2008). 
 70. See infra Part II.A. 
 71. See Kades, supra note 24, at 159 (“eliminating the 180-day exclusivity outright may have 
the unintended consequence of making pay-for-delay settlements more common”). 
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when generic companies challenged their patent validity.72 These Para-
graph IV litigation settlements have come under scrutiny because of their 
potentially anticompetitive effects.73 
In Paragraph IV litigations, courts consider three potentially anti-
competitive reverse payment settlements: (A) outside-the-scope patent 
settlements; (B) inside-the-scope patent settlements; and (C) potential 
sham exchanges that hide anticompetitive agreements. Both outside-the-
scope settlements agreements and sham exchanges are clear violations of 
antitrust law.74 But inside-the-scope agreements have split the circuits 
and caught the attention of the Supreme Court.75 
A. Outside-the-Scope Patent Settlements 
Outside-the-scope patent settlement agreements were the FTC’s 
first antitrust suits brought in response to Paragraph IV litigation.76 Out-
side-the-scope reverse payment settlements effectively expand the patent 
rights beyond what a patent legally grants the patent holder.77 One exam-
ple of an outside-the-scope settlement is when a patent holder and a ge-
neric company agree to use the mechanisms of the Act to delay generic 
entry into the market in a settlement agreement after a court finds the 
patent invalid.78 The patent holder and the generic producer agree that 
the generic would never begin commercial marketing, thus not triggering 
the first-to-file exclusivity period.79 This agreement prevents other gener-
ic companies from entering the market and creates a potential perpetual 
monopoly.80 This singular outside-the-scope settlement actually led to 
                                                            
 72. See Timothy A. Weil, Note, Devising a Legislative Solution to the Reverse Payment Set-
tlement Dilemma: How Congress Can Balance Competition, Innovation, and the Public Policy Fa-
voring the Settlement of Disputes Without Litigation, 55 ST. LOUIS L.J. 741, 759 (2011) (“[T]he 
complexity of reverse payment settlements has made it increasingly difficult for courts and the FTC 
to determine the reasonableness of reverse payments without launching a complex inquiry into the 
terms of the agreement and the business judgment of the settling parties.”). 
 73. See infra Part III. 
 74. Joblove v. Barr Labs., Inc., 466 F.3d 187, 203–04 (2d Cir. 2006); Andrx Pharms., Inc. v. 
Biovail Corp. Int’l, 256 F.3d 799 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (finding a reverse-payment settlement to be an 
antitrust violation because it extended patent rights beyond the exclusionary scope the patent rights 
granted to the patent holder); see also Elhauge & Krueger, supra note 16, at 286 (“[U]nless the pa-
tent was a sham or procured by fraud, reverse payment settlements were illegal only if the settlement 
exceeded the scope of the patent . . . .”). 
 75. See infra Part III. 
 76. Holman, supra note 18, at 547. 
 77. Jeff Thomas, Note, Schering-Plough and In Re Tamoxifen: Lawful Reverse Payments in 
the Hatch–Waxman Context, 22 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 13, 43–44 (2007). 
 78. In re K-Dur Antitrust Litig., 686 F.3d 197, 210 (3d Cir. 2012). 
 79. See infra Part III. 
 80. See infra Part III. 
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two different cases in which both courts found the settlement to be per se 
antitrust violations.81 
In 2001, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals decided Andrx Pharma-
ceuticals v. Biovail Corp. International, setting the precedent for finding 
that an outside of the scope patent settlement constituted an anticompeti-
tive antitrust violation.82 In Andrx, a generic producer and a pharmaceu-
tical patent holder agreed to a scheme that manipulated the structure of 
the Act to allow for delayed generic market entry.83 First, the generic 
producer won its invalidity suit, which ended the patent holder’s right to 
a monopoly on the drug.84 Next, the patent holder agreed to pay the ge-
neric producer $40 million a year for each year that the generic producer 
could produce the drug but did not do so. 85 This agreement was valuable 
to the patent holder because no other generic producer could enter the 
market until the first generic producer triggered and completed the first-
to-file exclusivity period.86 If the arrangement continued, then the (for-
mer) patent holder would have a continuing monopoly over the particular 
drug, despite a court finding that it had no right to the monopoly. 
Because of the anticompetitive attributes of the settlement, the D.C. 
Circuit Court of Appeals found that it could “reasonably be viewed as an 
attempt to allocate market share and preserve monopolistic conditions.”87 
Accordingly, the court rejected the validity of the post-judgment agree-
ment between the patent holder and the first generic producer because it 
inappropriately extended the patent monopoly.88 Furthermore, the court 
pointed out that “[a]lthough it is true that the first to file an ANDA is 
permitted to delay marketing as long as it likes, the statutory scheme 
does not envision the first applicant’s agreeing with the patentholder [sic] 
of the pioneer drug to delay the start of the 180-day exclusivity period.”89 
                                                            
 81. Andrx Pharms., Inc. v. Biovail Corp. Int’l, 256 F.3d 799, 908 (D.C. Cir. 2001). 
 82. See generally id.; see also In re K-Dur, 686 F.3d at 210 (discussing the importance of the 
precedent to reverse payment settlements). 
 83. James F. Ponsoldt & W. Hennen Ehrenclou, The Antitrust Legality of Pharmaceutical 
Patent Litigation Settlements, 2006 ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 37, 43. 
 84. In re K-Dur, 686 F.3d at 210 (discussing Andrx, 686 F.3d 197). 
 85. See id. Under the agreement, “[the former patent holder] would pay [the generic drug pro-
ducer] $40 million per year beginning on the date that [the generic drug producer] received final 
approval from the FDA and ending on the date that [the generic drug producer] either began selling 
[the generic drug] or was adjudged liable for patent infringement in the pending suit;” see also Mi-
chael A. Carrier, Why the “Scope of the Patent” Test Cannot Solve the Drug Patent Settlement Prob-
lem, 16 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 1 (2012). 
 86. Andrx Pharm., 256 F.3d at 809–10. 
 87. Id. at 811. 
 88. Id. at 809. 
 89. Id. 
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Thus, in Andrx, the requirements of antitrust prevention and the intention 
of the Act align to prevent extending the monopoly of an invalid patent.90 
The next case, In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litigation, established 
the original per se antitrust violation test as applied to Hatch–Waxman 
agreements. 91  The Cardizem case concerned the same settlement as 
Andrx.92 The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals also disfavored these types 
of agreements because of their anticompetitive effects.93 The Sixth Cir-
cuit described the agreement as “a naked, horizontal restraint of trade 
that is per se illegal because it is presumed to have the effect of reducing 
competition in the market for Cardizem CD and its generic equivalents to 
the detriment of consumers.”94 The court concluded that this attempt to 
eliminate competition was a “classic example of per se illegal restraint of 
trade.”95 This presumption acted as a strong deterrent of similar future 
agreements outside of the scope of the patent term. 
Yet despite the strong language of the court regarding outside of the 
scope agreements, the court actually discussed how to legally take ad-
vantage of the patent monopolies. The court stated that “it is one thing to 
take advantage of a monopoly that naturally arises from a patent, but an-
other thing altogether to bolster the patent’s effectiveness in inhibiting 
competitors . . . .”96 This comparison is credited with inspiring the legal 
inside the scope reverse-payments settlements.97 
B. Inside-the-Scope Patent Settlements 
Reverse payment settlements where the terms of the settlement do 
not go beyond the powers granted to the patent holder by the patent are 
within or inside the scope of the patent. These reverse payment settle-
ments are where the legal battle rages. The scope of the patent case histo-
ry is documented in Part III, but it is important to first understand why 
the issue is not easily resolved. 
Reverse payment settlements exist between a rock and a hard place: 
antitrust and patent law. At what point does exercising patent monopoly 
rights cross over into violating antitrust laws?98 “It is the tension between 
                                                            
 90. Id. at 799. 
 91. In re K-Dur Antitrust Litig., 686 F.3d 197, 210–11 (3d Cir. 2012). 
 92. Id. at 210. 
 93. In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig., 332 F.3d 896, 908 (6th Cir. 2003). 
 94. Id. at 911.  
 95. Id. at 908. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Carrier, supra note 85, at 1. 
 98. See generally THE SUPREME COURT AND PATENTS AND MONOPOLIES (Philip B. Kurland et 
al. eds., 1975). 
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restraints on anti-competitive [sic] behavior imposed by the Sherman Act 
and grants of patent monopolies under the patent laws, as complicated by 
the Hatch–Waxman Act, that underlies [a reverse-payment settlement] 
appeal.”99 
Within the scope settlements also create theoretical problems, forc-
ing the courts to assess difficult jurisprudential and practical considera-
tions. First, jurisprudentially, the courts must consider the proper role of 
the judiciary in disputes and how to construe settlement agreements. Se-
cond, practically, the courts have to weigh the interests of a multitude of 
stakeholders, all of which stand to lose millions to billions of dollars if 
the “wrong” test is applied. 
1. Jurisprudential Realities:                                                                     
Justice, Efficiency, Neutrality, and Presumptions 
The courts are struggling with the competing jurisprudential values 
of neutrality, justice, and efficiency. Every opinion that held reverse 
payment settlements legal justified itself in part because of the policy in 
favor of settlements, which promote efficiency.100 The settlements are 
considered efficient because they (1) “ease the burdens on courts”; (2) 
“decrease[] the expense and risk of litigation for parties”; and (3) “can 
result in a more satisfying resolution than would occur in litigation, be-
cause in negotiation the parties are free to consider the entire spectrum of 
relevant facts and principles . . . .”101 But in the case of reverse payment 
settlements, the justifications for promoting settlements are not applica-
ble to the intended beneficiaries of the Act.102 
For example, one counterweight to efficiency is justice. In the par-
ticular realm of reverse payment settlements, the settlements themselves 
may not be legal.103 Applying the policy of an efficient settlement to jus-
tify an illegal settlement is illogical, at best. In the case of reverse pay-
ment settlements, it is unlikely that either the “scope of the patent test” or 
                                                            
 99. In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig., 466 F.3d 187, 202 (2d Cir. 2006). 
 100. For example, the Ciprofloxacin court said, “[T]here is a long-standing policy in the law in 
favor of settlements, and this policy extends to patent infringement litigation.” In re Ciprofloxacin 
Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 544 F.3d 1323, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
 101 . Margaret Meriwether Cordray, Settlement Agreements and the Supreme Court, 48 
HASTINGS L.J. 9, 36–37 (1996). 
 102. “[Michael] Carrier suggests that the Hatch–Waxman regime reflects a policy in favor of 
patent challenges, that the regulatory regime is relatively ineffective in achieving this purpose, and 
that reverse payments are ‘uniquely concerning’ because they allow branded and generic manufac-
turers to limit competition.” David W. Opderbeck, Rational Antitrust Policy and Reverse Payment 
Settlements in Hatch–Waxman Patent Litigation, 98 GEO. L.J. 1303, 1322 (2010). 
 103. See In re K-Dur Antitrust Litig., 686 F.3d 197, 218 (3d Cir. 2012). 
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the per se antitrust test adequately aligns the courts’ decisions with the 
most just result.104 
Although courts and parties enjoy the certainty that presumptions 
provide, reverse payment settlements are an area where caution is appro-
priate. Presumptions should stem from a history of correlation or an ex-
pression of the general sense of courts’ policy foundations.105 And al-
though presumption tests are efficient, the tests should not truncate     
justice.106 While embodying their role as a neutral arbiter, courts should 
view both tests with a healthy dose of apprehension.107 Any reverse-
payment legislation should allow a court to act neutrally when consider-
ing reverse-payment settlement litigation. 
2. Practical Consequences: Battle Between Private and                             
Public Beneficiaries 
Reverse payment settlements create a divide between interested 
parties. Generally, the parties to the original patent validity suit—patent 
holders and generic producers—seek “the scope of the patent” test for 
evaluating reverse payment settlements.108 Conversely, the government 
and consumers favor the FTC test.109 Although the patent holders and 
generic drug manufacturers are the parties to reverse-payment settlement 
agreements, the government and consumers also have a high stake in 
which test is adopted. In the Hatch–Waxman Act, the Legislature at-
tempted to leverage private actions to benefit the public welfare.110 Con-
sequently, private actors’ reasonable self-interest is pitted against the 
overall public good. Unfortunately, pharmaceutical companies cannot 
make maximum profits if the public pays minimal costs. 
                                                            
 104. Butler & Jarosch, supra note 52, at 120–21. 
 105. Thomas, supra note 77, at 16. 
 106. According to some scholars, the Court is moving away from a per se antitrust violation 
rule:  
Beginning in the late-1970s . . . , the Supreme Court set out to place significant limits on 
the application of the per se rule and move ‘from a dichotomous categorical approach to a 
more nuanced and case specific inquiry.’ Accordingly, it began to ‘reframe antitrust rules 
around core economic concepts of anticompetitive effect, market power, and efficien-
cies,’ thereby eroding the long-standing analytical dichotomy. 
Weil, supra note 72, at 759 (internal citations omitted). 
 107. Timothy Casey, Electronic Surveillance and the Right to Be Secure, 41 U.C. DAVIS L. 
REV. 977, 1031 (2008) (“In the traditional conception of the adversarial system, the court plays the 
role of neutral arbiter, deciding only the issues framed by the parties, based on the evidence provided 
by the parties.”). 
 108. See infra Part III.A. 
 109. See infra Part III.B. 
 110. See Senate Hearings, supra note 26. 
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The uncertainty linked to developing new life-saving medicines 
creates high stakes for patent holders. In one year, pharmaceutical patent 
holders spent a combined $50 billion investment in life science re-
search.111 And even for only one drug, the risks and the costs are incredi-
bly high: “When factoring in the costs of false starts and blind alleys, it 
can take literally several hundred million dollars to bring an effective 
new drug to market.”112 As one court noted, “[o]nly one in every 5,000 
medicines tested for the potential to treat illness is eventually approved 
for patient use, and studies estimate that developing a new drug takes 10 
to 15 years and costs more than $1.3 billion.”113 Costs and timelines as-
sociated with developing new life-saving drugs demonstrate the incredi-
ble risks that pharmaceutical patent holders take. Accordingly, pharma-
ceutical patent holders argue that encouraging challenges to the validity 
of their patents would “hamper innovation and research, create unneces-
sary litigation and unconstitutionally take property from patent own-
ers.”114 
Meanwhile, the legislature tried to use generic drug manufactur-
ers—another private actor—as a proxy for the government’s and con-
sumers’ desired outcome: more generic drugs. This plan has backfired. 
While both the public and the generic manufacturers benefit when a pa-
tent is declared invalid, all of the costs and risks of proving invalidity are 
placed on the generic manufacturers. The costs and risks align patent 
holders’ interests with the generic producers’ interests. 
If the generic manufacturers and patent holders settle invalidity 
suits for an amount higher than the expected profits for the generic pro-
ducers but lower than the expected profits from maintained validity, both 
companies reduce all of the risks tied up in litigation proceedings. For 
example, three reverse payment settlements gave generic producers $60 
million, 115  $49.1 million, 116  and $21 million, respectively. 117  As self-
interested private actors, it is only logical that generic producers would 
settle rather than litigate because settlement offers a higher monetary 
reward and lower relative risk. 
For consumers—the intended beneficiaries of the Hatch–Waxman 
Act—reverse settlement payments have real and life changing effects. 
                                                            
 111. Id. at 3. 
 112. Id. 
 113. FTC v. Watson Pharm., Inc., 677 F.3d 1298, 1300 (11th Cir. 2012), cert. granted, 133 S. 
Ct. 787 (2012), rev’d sub nom. FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223 (2013). 
 114. H.R. REP. No. 98-857(II) (1984). 
 115. In re K-Dur Antitrust Litig., 686 F.3d 197, 206 (3d Cir. 2012). 
 116. In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 544 F.3d 1323, 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
 117. In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig., 466 F.3d 187, 193–94 (2d Cir. 2006). 
1074 Seattle University Law Review [Vol. 37:1059 
The settlements externalize costs to the detriment of consumers. In one 
case, the court noted that “[t]hese settlements will delay generic entry, 
forcing consumers to pay substantially higher prices for prescription 
drugs. Already these deals are having an impact. A recent analysis by the 
FTC economists estimate that these types of deals cost consumers $3.5 
billion per year.”118 Another commentator looking at the monetary incen-
tives in reverse payment settlements noted, “On four blockbusters alone, 
consumers are expected to save over 16 billion dollars because of generic 
entry prior to patent expiration.”119 Still, steep costs do not convey the 
reality of the issue for consumers. During a Senate hearing regarding 
proposed amendments to the Hatch–Waxman Act, one senator stated, 
“[W]e must never lose sight of the hard fact of life that an unaffordable 
medication may be the same as no medication at all.”120 Thus, consumers 
have a collective monetary interest and health interests in invalidating 
weak pharmaceutical patents. 
Meanwhile, the government is trying to balance the public and pri-
vate interests while also having its own interest as a drug consumer. In 
one FTC report on the costs of reverse payment settlements, the FTC 
noted, “The federal government is particularly affected: Federal dollars 
accounted for an estimated 31 percent of the $235 billion spent on pre-
scription drugs in 2008, and that share is expected to rise to 40 percent 
by 2018.” 121  President Obama has supported the plan in his budget 
statements. 122  Furthermore, the FTC has consistently litigated reverse 
payment settlements as antitrust violations and campaigned Congress to 
revise the Hatch–Waxman Act to support this position.123 Generally, the 
Executive Branch administrative agencies have been in support of patent 
invalidity.124 
Critics of the scope of the patent test would characterize reverse- 
payment settlements as patent holders effectively paying generic compa-
nies not to challenge the validity of their pharmaceutical patents.125 The-
se settlements delay generic drugs from entering the market and manu-
facturers from selling the same product at a lower cost.126 Essentially, the 
                                                            
 118. Kades, supra note 24, at 143. 
 119. Id. 
 120. Senate Hearing, supra note 26, at 3. 
 121. Feinstein, supra note 17, at 3. 
 122. Colleen Kelly, The Balance Between Innovation and Competition: The Hatch–Waxman 
Act, the 2003 Amendments, and Beyond, 66 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 417, 474 (2011). 
 123. See, e.g., Feinstein, supra note 17, at 1–2. 
 124. The U.S. Department of Justice originally supported the Court’s outside the scope of the 
patent test, but later switched to support the FTC test. See Butler & Jarosch, supra note 52, at 61–62. 
 125. Feinstein, supra note 17, at 3. 
 126. Id.   
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effects of inside-the-scope settlements are the same as the effects of out-
side-the-scope settlements—only the certainty of invalidity has changed. 
And here, the implication is that the patent holders simply realized that 
their patents were invalid early enough to make an agreement with the 
generic drug company. The unknown answer to the underlying question 
is the key to resolving this issue: Is the underlying patent valid? This is 
the true conflict with which the federal courts have been grappling. Thus, 
the proposed legislation, discussed below, recommends a legislative 
change targeting the central underlying issue: weak patent validity. 
C. Sham Exchanges Creating Anticompetitive Agreements 
Courts have alluded to one other type of reverse-payment settle-
ment: sham consideration. 127  Some commentators consider sham ex-
changes to be the next evolution of the reverse-payment settlement prob-
lem.128 Sham exchanges are reverse-payment settlement agreements that 
trade consideration—other than an agreement not to infringe on the pa-
tent—in exchange for the settlement money, but in reality the agreement 
is just legitimizing the high price of the reverse-payment settlement.129 
For example, in In re K-Dur Antitrust Litigation, the Third Circuit 
implied that such fraud may exist in the reverse-payment settlement con-
text.130 In that settlement, the generic drug producer agreed to settle the 
dispute and turn over ownership of one of its own patents in exchange 
for $60 million and a portion of the profits from that patent.131 The phar-
maceutical patent holder never subsequently used the generic company’s 
patents.132 This led the court to suggest that the unused patents may be 
merely a sham to help explain the excessive settlement payment.133 Alt-
hough the K-Dur court did not directly label the consideration as a sham, 
                                                            
 127. See In re K-Dur Antitrust Litig., 686 F.3d 197, 205–06 (3d Cir. 2012); In re Tamoxifen, 
466 F.3d 187, 208–09 (2d Cir. 2006). 
 128. Michael A. Carrier, Solving the Drug Settlement Problem: The Legislative Approach, 41 
RUTGERS L.J. 83, 93 (2009). 
 129. Or as Carrier notes, 
No longer are brand firms making simple cash payments for generics not to enter the 
market. Instead, they are paying generics for IP licenses, for supplying raw materials or 
finished products, and for helping to promote products. They are paying milestones, up-
front payments, and development fees for unrelated products. In many cases, they are 
guaranteeing that the settling generic will enjoy the exclusivity period. And in the latest 
trend . . . they are agreeing not to launch authorized, brand-sponsored, generics. 
Id. 
 130. See In re K-Dur, 686 F.3d at 206. 
 131. Id. at 205. 
 132. Id. at 205–06. 
 133. Id. at 206. 
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it sided with the plaintiffs who did so expressly.134 These sham exchang-
es may become more prevalent because they lend legitimacy to the oth-
erwise suspicious reverse payment settlements. 
III. WHY THE SUPREME COURT’S DECISION IN ACTAVIS DOES NOT END 
THE CONFLICT 
Recently, the Supreme Court granted certiorari and decided Actavis, 
a reverse-payment settlement antitrust case. 135  This much-anticipated 
decision resolved which test should be applied in the federal courts: the 
full rule of reason.136 This decision effectively rejected both of the ap-
proaches adopted in the circuit courts.137 
Until the summer of 2013, the consensus amongst circuit courts 
was that reverse payment settlements were presumptively valid unless 
the terms of the settlement went beyond the scope of the patent.138 But 
then the Third Circuit in K-Dur became the first court to adopt the quick 
look rule of reason analysis139—an accelerated form of antitrust analysis 
that was later rejected in Actavis.140 The advent of this circuit split is the 
likely reason for the Supreme Court granting certiorari in Actavis and 
deciding that all previously applied approaches were invalid.141 
The Supreme Court’s decision to apply the full rule of reason anti-
trust analysis was probably the best judicial response to reverse-payment 
settlement suits, but even so, the Court still does not require a determina-
tion of the patent’s validity.142 This is a wrong result, and it is up to Con-
gress to correct the misstep. In order to understand why the Supreme 
Court’s decision did not address the underlying problem of reverse-
                                                            
 134. Id. In K-Dur, the court stated, 
Plaintiffs contend that the license was a sham and that the $60 million paid as royalties 
for Niacor-SR was actually compensation for Upsher’s agreement to delay the entry of its 
generic extended-release potassium tablet. On the other hand, defendants contend that 
Schering’s board valued the license deal separately and that $60 million was its good 
faith valuation of the licenses at the time. 
Id. 
 135. FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223 (2013). 
 136. Id. at 2226. 
 137. Id. at 2227 (finding error in the Eleventh Circuit’s presumptive approach—the “scope of 
the patent test”); id. at 2237 (declining to adopt the FTC’s proposed quick-look rule of reason analy-
sis). 
 138. See, e.g., FTC v. Watson Pharm., Inc., 677 F.3d 1298 (11th Cir. 2012), cert. granted, 133 
S. Ct. 787 (2012), rev’d sub nom. FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223 (2013). 
 139. See In re K-Dur Antitrust Litig., 686 F.3d 197 (3d Cir. 2012). 
 140. Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2237 (declining to adopt the FTC’s proposed quick-look rule of 
reason analysis). 
 141. See sources cited supra note 137. 
 142. Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2236–37. 
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payment settlement suits, it is necessary to analyze what the Court was 
rejecting: the scope of the patent test and the FTC test. 
A. Watson and the Scope of the Patent Test 
The predominant test adopted by the federal circuit courts prior to 
Actavis was the scope of the patent test.143 The Second,144 Eleventh,145 
and Federal Circuit146 adopted this particular test, whereas only one cir-
cuit, the Third Circuit,147 adopted a different test. The scope of the patent 
test has a three-step analysis: (1) determine the scope of the exclusionary 
potential of the patent; (2) determine the extent to which the agreements 
exceed that scope; and (3) decide what the resulting anti-competitive ef-
fects are.148 
The courts justified adopting the scope of the patent test for five 
main reasons. First, patent law is inherently designed to have anticompet-
itive effects.149 Second, there is a strong policy in favor of settlements.150 
Third, settlements are the most fiscally logical solution for the parties 
involved in Paragraph IV litigation.151 Fourth, the courts are concerned 
about funding future pharmaceutical innovation.152 Fifth, the first-to-file 
status of the generic producer does not prevent other companies from 
challenging the validity of the patent.153 
                                                            
 143. Id.; Watson, 677 F.3d at 1309. 
 144. In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig., 466 F.3d 187 (2d Cir. 2006). 
 145. Watson, 677 F.3d 1298; Schering-Plough v. FTC, 402 F.3d 1056 (11th Cir. 2005); Valley 
Drug v. Geneva Pharm., Inc., 344 F.3d 1294 (11th Cir. 2003). 
 146. In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 544 F.3d 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
 147. In re K-Dur Antitrust Litig., 686 F.3d 197 (3d Cir. 2012). 
 148. Schering-Plough, 402 F.3d at 1066. 
 149. Id. at 1064; In re Ciprofloxacin, 544 F.3d at 1333. 
 150. The Tamoxifen court justifies its decision based on the policy in favor of settlements. This 
is clear through its statements that courts are “‘bound to encourage’ the settlement of litigation.” In 
re Tamoxifen, 466 F.3d at 202; see also In re Ciprofloxacin, 544 F.3d at 1333; Schering-Plough, 402 
F.3d at 1064 (citing Valley Drug, 344 F.3d at 1309). 
 151. In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig., 466 F.3d 187, 209 (2d Cir. 2006). 
 152 . Posited first by pharmaceutical lobbying groups during the creation of the Hatch–
Waxman Act, “A group of drug companies opposed to the legislation in its current form articulated 
its reservations. They argue that the bill will hamper innovation and research, create unnecessary 
litigation and unconstitutionally take property from patent owners.” H.R. REP. No. 98-857(II) (1984) 
(original capitalization omitted). Also, “[r]ules severely restricting patent settlements might also be 
contrary to the goals of the patent laws because the increased number of continuing lawsuits that 
would result would heighten the uncertainty surrounding patents and might delay innovation.” In re 
Tamoxifen, 466 F.3d at 203. Although the courts also questioned the underlying validity of the patent 
at question: “Perhaps it is unwise to protect patent monopolies that rest on such dubious pa-
tents. . . . Why, after all—viewing the settlement through an antitrust lens—should the potential 
competitor be permitted to receive such a windfall at the ultimate expense of drug purchasers?” Id. at 
208, 210. 
 153. In re Ciprofloxacin, 544 F.3d at 1334. 
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The scope-of-the patent approach was characterized as the per se 
legality approach to reverse payment settlements.154  The standard for 
finding the settlements to be anticompetitive is incredibly high: “[S]o 
long as the patent litigation is neither a sham nor otherwise baseless, the 
patent holder is seeking to arrive at a settlement in order to protect that 
which it is presumably entitled: a lawful monopoly over the manufacture 
and distribution of the patented product.”155 
Watson—the Eleventh Circuit case that the Supreme Court re-
versed—reaffirmed the scope of the patent test and added more certainty 
to how prior cases would be construed in that jurisdiction.156 The court 
“clarified that its use in an earlier case of the phrase ‘strength of the pa-
tent’ referred to ‘the potential exclusionary scope of the patent,’ which 
means ‘the exclusionary rights appearing on the patent’s face and not the 
underlying merits of the infringement claim.’”157 
The Eleventh Circuit—while implying that it was too complex for 
application—understood what would truly be required to know whether 
the settlement was valid: 
[It] is worth emphasizing that what the FTC proposes is that we at-
tempt to decide how some other court in some other case at some 
other time was likely to have resolved some other claim if it had 
been pursued to judgment. If we did that we would be deciding a 
patent case within an antitrust case about the settlement of the pa-
tent case, a turducken task.158 
Despite its satirical tone, this court accurately portrayed the complexity 
facing the court in reverse-payment settlement suits. This “turducken 
task,” as labeled by the Eleventh Circuit inspired the legislative solution 
proposed in Part V below. 
                                                            
 154. For example, the Federal Circuit first acknowledged the presumptive nature of the scope 
of the patent test through its statement that “a patent is presumed to be valid.” Id. at 1336. As one 
commentator notes, “Courts then imperceptibly shifted from punishing conduct ‘outside the scope’ 
of the patent to immunizing conduct ‘within the scope’ of the patent. In doing so, the test took a 
dramatic turn toward deference.” Carrier, supra note 85, at 3. 
 155. In re Tamoxifen, 466 F.3d at 208 (quoting Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 283 U.S. 
163, 208 (1931)). 
 156. See FTC v. Watson Pharm., Inc., 677 F.3d 1298, 1315 (11th Cir. 2012), cert. granted, 133 
S. Ct. 787 (2012), rev’d sub nom. FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223 (2013); Carrier, supra note 
85, at 4. 
 157. Carrier, supra note 85, at 4 (quoting Watson, 677 F.3d at 1311 n.8). 
 158. Watson, 677 F.3d at 1315. 
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B. K-Dur and the FTC Test 
Meanwhile, in In re K-Dur Antitrust Litigation, the FTC finally 
found a jurisdiction—the Third Circuit Court of Appeals—that approved 
of its approach to reverse payment settlements.159 The Third Circuit test 
was an intentional departure from the doctrine set forth by the other cir-
cuits: 
[T]he finder of fact must treat any payment from a patent holder to a 
generic patent challenger who agrees to delay entry into the market 
as prima facie evidence of an unreasonable restraint on trade, which 
could be rebutted by showing that the payment (1) was for a pur-
pose other than delayed entry or (2) offers some pro-competitive 
benefit.160 
This approach applied the quick-look rule of reason and therefore created 
a rebuttable presumption that reverse payment settlements were viola-
tions of antitrust law.161 
The court justified its adoption of this test as an extension of the per 
se antitrust violation test created in Andrx—the outside-the-scope patent 
test.162 It also noted that it “embrace[d] [the Andrx] court’s common 
sense conclusion that ‘[a] payment flowing from the innovator to the 
challenging generic firm may suggest strongly the anticompetitive intent 
of the parties entering the agreement.’”163 The court also disdained the 
idea that “[the scope-of-the-patent] approach nominally protects intellec-
tual property, not on the strength of a patent holder’s legal rights, but on 
the strength of its wallet.”164 Essentially, this decision was based on the 
apparent facts of the case rather than a compilation of legal doctrines. 
The court suggested that reverse payment settlements, on their face, seem 
to be anticompetitive, unreasonable restraints on trade.165 
This fact-based analysis is based on inherently incomplete infor-
mation because the quick-look rule of reason does not assess whether the 
patent is valid, but rather presumes the patent’s invalidity. This approach 
would only be appropriate if it was correct to assume that all reverse 
payment settlements are near per se antitrust violations. 
                                                            
 159. See generally In re K-Dur Antitrust Litig., 686 F.3d 197 (3d Cir. 2012). 
 160. Id. at 218. 
 161. Id. 
 162. Id. 
 163. Id. (quoting Andrx Pharm., Inc. v. Biovail Corp. Int’l, 256 F.3d 799, 809 (D.C. Cir. 
2001)). 
 164. Id. at 217. 
 165. Id. at 218. 
1080 Seattle University Law Review [Vol. 37:1059 
C. Actavis Wrongly Avoids the Turducken Task 
In the end, Actavis oversimplified the problem in reverse payment 
settlements to be primarily a question of antitrust law.166 The Court ini-
tially decided that antitrust and patent law would be applied in each re-
verse-payment settlement case.167 Then the Court’s job became the sim-
ple question of determining which antitrust doctrine to apply, and the 
Court adopted the full rule of reason analysis.168 
But the Court did not resolve two problems that will result in future 
litigation. First, the Court did not outline clear guidelines about how to 
assess the litigation for the lower courts; rather, it left the process for de-
termining antitrust liability to the lower courts.169 And second, the Court 
raised and dismissed the need to litigate the underlying patent validity in 
a full patent infringement suit.170 In Actavis, the Court stated, “[T]he size 
of the unexplained reverse payment can provide a workable surrogate for 
a patent’s weakness, all without forcing a court to conduct a detailed ex-
ploration of the validity of the patent itself.”171 Rather, the structure of 
the lawsuit and the settlement size as a “surrogate for patent strength” are 
the core of the reverse-payment settlement problem. The settlement 
amount as a surrogate for patent strength is a problem because this ig-
nores the scholarship suggesting that the size of the settlement may relate 
more to the profitability of the drug than the strength or weakness of the 
patent. The structure is a problem because of the remaining turducken 
task, which will lead the lower courts to resolve a question that many 
experts have not been able to answer: how do you assess whether a set-
tlement is anticompetitive if you do not resolve whether the patent is val-
id? 
                                                            
 166. “And the basic question here is whether such an agreement can sometimes unreasonably 
diminish competition in violation of the antitrust laws.” FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2227 
(2013). 
 167. Id. at 2231. Or as the Court stated, 
[I]t would be incongruous to determine antitrust legality by measuring the settlement’s 
anticompetitive effects solely against patent law policy, rather than by measuring them 
against procompetitive [sic] antitrust policies as well. And indeed, contrary to the 
[c]ircuit’s view that the only pertinent question is whether ‘the settlement agree-
ment . . . fall[s] within’ the legitimate ‘scope’ of the patent’s ‘exclusionary potential,’ . . . 
this Court has indicated that patent and antitrust policies are both relevant in determining 
the ‘scope of the patent monopoly’—and consequently antitrust law immunity—that is 
conferred by a patent. 
Id. (internal citations omitted). 
 168. Id. at 2238. 
 169. “We therefore leave to the lower courts the structuring of the present rule-of-reason anti-
trust litigation.” Id. 
 170. Id. at 2236–37. 
 171. In re K-Dur Antitrust Litig., 686 F.3d 197, 218 (3d Cir. 2012). 
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These problems were likely left unanswered because they need a 
congressional, not a judicial, solution. 
D. Inevitability of An Insufficient Judicial Outcome 
The scope of the patent test would have vindicated the interests of 
the patent holders and the generic manufacturers, and would have pro-
tected both parties’ investments in new research. The FTC test would 
have furthered the interests of consumers and the government as a con-
sumer. But the solution proposed by the Court answered only one ques-
tion about the reverse-payment settlement analysis—which antitrust test 
to use—without resolving the conflict. The patent will not be held per se 
valid without any analysis of antitrust implications, but the full rule of 
reason is the most nuanced and time-consuming form of antitrust analy-
sis. Moreover, the analysis is gutted of its central inquiry. The Court did 
not define the appropriate process for courts to use when deciding to ac-
cept or reject a reverse-payment settlement agreement, other than to dis-
miss the need to litigate the underlying patent validity. Therefore, the 
rule of reason analysis will require lower courts to assess the potential 
anticompetitive effects of the agreement without ever determining if the 
patent is actually weak. 
The Court chose the full rule of reason analysis because neither 
presumption test was appropriate.172 A decision in favor of the scope of 
the patent test would essentially decide the issue in favor of the patent 
holder.173 A decision in favor of the FTC test would have trapped the 
patent holders, and potentially generic drug companies, in litigation and 
afforded a presumption in favor of the FTC and consumers.174 It is not 
appropriate for the courts either to decide that the patent is presumptively 
valid or to presume that an antitrust violation occurred merely because a 
reverse-payment settlement exists.175 
Despite being the best judicial solution, the Court’s solution fails to 
directly address the question of patent validity, which is the key to re-
verse payment settlements. The full rule of reason analysis makes the 
                                                            
 172. See infra Part IV. 
 173. See FTC v. Watson Pharm., Inc., 677 F.3d 1298, 1312 (11th Cir. 2012), cert. granted, 133 
S. Ct. 787 (2012), rev’d sub nom. FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223 (2013). 
 174. Scott A. Backus, Comment, Reversing Course on Reverse Payment Settlements in the 
Pharmaceutical Industry: Has Schering-Plough Created the Blueprint for Defensible Antitrust Vio-
lations?, 60 OKLA. L. REV. 375, 417 (2007). 
 175. See Butler & Jarosch, supra note 52, at 120 (“Selecting the wrong antitrust analysis may 
result in either prosecution of procompetitive [sic] or neutral business conduct (‘Type I error’)—or 
failure to prosecute activity that is anticompetitive (‘Type II error’).”). For further comparison of 
Type I and Type II errors, see id. at 120–21. 
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results of future litigation murky because it focuses on the reverse-
payment settlement, not the patent.176 Now, therefore, as future courts 
apply the full rule of reason analysis to reverse payment settlements, they 
will base their decisions on inherently incomplete information about the 
strength of the patent. 
IV. INSUFFICIENCY OF PREVIOUSLY PROPOSED REVERSE-PAYMENT 
SETTLEMENT LEGISLATION 
Since the original enactment of the Hatch–Waxman Act and the 
subsequent advent of reverse-payment settlement litigation, both the 
Senate and the House of Representatives have proposed bills that attempt 
to solve the reverse-payment settlement problem.177 Thus far, no bill ad-
dressing the reverse-payment settlement issue directly has passed both 
houses of Congress.178 And more importantly, none of the proposed leg-
islation directly addresses whether the underlying patent is valid or inva-
lid.179 
Legislators are acting in response to the courts rather than analyzing 
the fundamental underlying problem: uncertainty about the strength of 
the underlying patent. All of the pieces of proposed legislation focus on 
defining reverse payment settlements as anticompetitive, which seeming-
ly responds to the decisions of the majority of circuit courts.180 For ex-
ample, Senate Bill 214—the only current piece of legislation addressing 
the issue of reverse payment settlements—attempts to create a presump-
                                                            
 176. In re K-Dur Antitrust Litig., 686 F.3d 197, 218 (3d Cir. 2012). 
 177. S. 214, 113th Cong. (1st Sess. 2013) (creating a presumption that reverse payment settle-
ments are anticompetitive: “an agreement shall be presumed to have anticompetitive effects and be 
unlawful” if a reverse-payment settlement occurs); H.R. 3995, 112th Cong., (2nd Sess. 2012) 
(“Conduct Prohibited. It shall be unlawful for any person to directly or indirectly be a party to any 
agreement resolving or settling a patent infringement claim in which” a reverse-payment settlement 
occurs); S. 369, 111th Cong. (1st Sess. 2009); Protecting Consumer Access to Generic Drugs Act of 
2009, H.R. 1706, 111th Cong. (2009) (making reverse payments per se illegal under the FTC Act); 
see Carrier, supra note 128, at 90–97. 
 178. Senate Bill 214 is the only piece of legislation in the current Congress that addresses 
reverse payment settlements, and it has only been introduced into the Senate. See S. 214; see also 
Carrier, supra note 128, at 90–97 (2009) (discussing past reverse-payment settlement bills, all of 
which proposed presumption based approaches to the problem). 
 179. See Carrier, supra note 128, at 90–97. 
 180. For example, 
The purposes of this Act are . . . (1) to enhance competition by stopping anticompetitive 
agreements between brand name and generic drug manufacturers that limit, delay, or oth-
erwise prevent competition from generic drugs; and (2) to support the purpose and intent 
of antitrust law by prohibiting anticompetitive practices in the pharmaceutical industry 
that harm consumers. 
S. 214 § (2)(b). 
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tion that reverse payment settlements are invalid.181 This bill is problem-
atic because it presumes that all reverse payment settlements are pre-
sumptively antitrust violations and does not account for reverse payment 
settlements with a valid underlying patent.182 All other proposed bills 
regarding reverse payment settlements share the same fundamental prob-
lem.183 And due to this fundamental problem, no bill proposing a pre-
sumption of antitrust has been enacted.184 
The Actavis decision effectively rejected the assumption of validity 
adopted by the plurality of circuit courts.185 The stated purpose of Senate 
Bill 369—the Preserve Access to Affordable Generics Act—was to “stop 
anticompetitive agreements between brand name and generic drug manu-
facturers that limit, delay, or otherwise prevent competition from generic 
drugs,” all to ensure that courts “do not make improper presumptions” 
when reviewing the agreements.186 
Furthermore, none of the proposed bills directly address the issue of 
patent strength. Although Senate Bill 214 does list out “competitive fac-
tors” which might overcome the presumption that a reverse-payment set-
tlement is invalid, the consideration of such factors is primarily within 
the discretion of the FTC.187 Furthermore, nothing in the proposed legis-
lation suggests that the FTC would then be empowered to litigate the 
validity of the underlying patent. The bill only allows the FTC to “initi-
ate a proceeding to enforce the provisions of this section against the par-
ties to any agreement resolving or settling . . . a patent infringement 
claim, in connection with the sale of a drug product.”188 And the remedy 
under this structure is not necessarily patent invalidity, but rather civil 
                                                            
 181. Id. §28(a)(2). 
 182. See the comparison of Type I and Type II errors in Butler & Jarosch, supra note 52, at 
120–21. 
 183. See, e.g., H.R. 3995, 112th Cong., (2nd Sess. 2012) (“Conduct Prohibited. It shall be 
unlawful for any person to directly or indirectly be a party to any agreement resolving or settling a 
patent infringement claim in which” a reverse-payment settlement occurs); H.R. 1706, 111th Cong. 
(1st Sess. 2009) (making reverse payments per se illegal under the FTC Act); see also Carrier, supra 
note 128, at 90–97. 
 184. S. 214, 113th Cong. (1st Sess. 2013) (introduced in Senate); H.R. 3995, 112th Cong., (2nd 
Sess. 2012) (introduced in the House of Representatives); S. Res. 287, 111th Cong. (1st Sess. 2009) 
(Resolution introduced in the Senate); S. 369, 111th Cong. (1st Sess. 2009) (reported in Senate); see 
Carrier, supra note 128, at 90–97 
 185. FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223 (2013). 
 186. Carrier, supra note 128, at 96 (quoting Substitute Amendment to S. 369 § 2(b)(1)(3), 
111th Cong. (1st Sess. 2009)). 
 187. S. 214 § 28(e)(1) (“The Federal Trade Commission may issue . . . regulations implement-
ing and interpreting this section.”). 
 188. Id. § 28(a)(1). 
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damages.189 Thus, the proposed bill’s remedies are activated by a pre-
sumption-based administrative process, not based on a full patent validity 
suit.190 
The presumption-based approach to reverse payment settlements 
misses the nuance needed to address Paragraph IV settlements. The root 
of the problem is that some of the settlements may be legitimate—
making a presumptive antitrust violation conclusion inappropriate191—
while others may be anticompetitive—making per se legality inappropri-
ate.192 Congress needs an approach that allows the courts to weigh both 
options. The judge-based approach to this conundrum has been to advo-
cate the adoption of the full rule of reason analysis.193 But a rule of rea-
son analysis under Actavis will still require a court to consider whether 
antitrust violations occurred without the court knowing whether the un-
derlying patent is valid. The proposed legislation in Part V directly ad-
dresses the question of patent validity by realigning the ability to litigate 
patent validity with the correct stakeholders. 
V. PROPOSED SOLUTION: REALIGN STAKEHOLDER INTERESTS TO THEIR 
ABILITY TO ACT THROUGH LEGISLATION 
In this Part, section A explains the essential misalignment of stake-
holders in the Hatch–Waxman regulatory scheme. Section B proposes 
new legislation and explains the advantages of an invalidity-based ap-
proach to reverse payment settlements. Section C anticipates criticism of 
the proposed legislation. 
A. The Hatch–Waxman Act’s Misalignment of Stakeholders 
As is shown through the discussion of the current judicial and legis-
lative battles, the Hatch–Waxman Act suffers from a structural design 
problem.194 Congress attempted to align the private interests of generic 
drug producers with the public interests of consumers.195 This choice 
made sense for several reasons. First, the direct market beneficiaries of 
non-patented drugs are generic drug producers. Second, Congress’s deci-
sion to encourage generic drug producers to file Paragraph IV ANDAs 
                                                            
 189. Id. § 28(g). 
 190. See id. § 28(e)(1). 
 191. Butler & Jarosch, supra note 52, at 120–21 (describing prosecution of Type I errors as 
“condemning legitimate business conduct that is not anticompetitive”). 
 192. Id. at 121 (describing Type II Errors as failing to prosecute activity that is anticompeti-
tive). 
 193. Id. 
 194. See supra Parts II–III. 
 195. See supra Part II. 
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externalized the cost of finding and invalidating weak patents. Third, 
when legislation requires pharmaceutical patent holders to respond by 
either instigating litigation or conceding patent invalidity, the legislation 
helps consumers by either testing or confirming patent invalidity. 
Theoretically, the Hatch–Waxman regulatory scheme should vet 
out weak patents that should be challenged and, potentially, invalidated. 
The invalidation of weak patents would then benefit both the public sec-
tor consumers and the private sector generic producers. The generic pro-
ducers would act as a proxy for the consumers, and all of these stake-
holders—generic producers, government, and consumers—would bene-
fit. But by externalizing the costs, Congress has also externalized control 
over the efficacy of the Hatch–Waxman Act in Paragraph IV litigations. 
Post-enactment, generic drug producers were empowered as the proxy 
litigators, and therefore proxy negotiators of the pro-invalidation posi-
tion, despite being self-interested private actors. 
This private actor self-interest was apparently the point of leverage 
that the pharmaceutical patent holders focused on in their negotiations 
for reverse payment settlements. The pharmaceutical patent holders 
found that if they could provide a financial benefit to the generic produc-
ers while simultaneously eliminating the risk of litigation, some generic 
producers would be willing to negotiate a settlement.196 The courts found 
the first iteration of this settlement strategy to be per se antitrust viola-
tions: outside-the-scope patent settlements.197 The second iteration of this 
settlement strategy is the reverse-payment settlement: within-the-scope 
patent settlements.198 The third potential iteration of this settlement strat-
egy is fraudulent business agreements, which include sham consideration 
as well as money in exchange for settlement.199 
The settling parties’ progressively subtle strategies to settle Para-
graph IV litigations suggest that it is tempting for private actors to main-
tain patent validity, regardless of patent strength or weakness. Because of 
the nature of settlement negotiations between private actors, regulatory 
agencies—such as the FTC—are only able to collect circumstantial evi-
dence of potential antitrust violations. 
Still, the criticism set forth by the Watson court—the decision that 
Actavis reversed—is well-taken.200 Congress created a structure where 
                                                            
 196. See, e.g., FTC v. Watson Pharm., Inc., 677 F.3d 1298, 1305 (11th Cir. 2012), cert. grant-
ed, 133 S. Ct. 787 (2012), rev’d sub nom. FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223 (2013). 
 197. See supra Part II.A. 
 198. See supra Part II.B. 
 199. See supra Part II.C.; In re K-Dur Antitrust Litig., 686 F.3d 197 (3d Cir. 2012). 
 200. Watson, 677 F.3d at 1315. The court stated, 
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antitrust regulators are one step removed from executing the actual goals 
of the public. Congress also created a system that empowers self-
interested parties, rather than parties working for the public interest, to 
act as proxies for consumer interests in pharmaceutical patent invalidity 
suits. Congress should not have created a system that encourages litiga-
tion, a context that makes anticompetitive behavior attractive, and subse-
quently fails to monitor or create disincentives to prevent antitrust viola-
tions. 
B. Proposed Legislation to Solve the Reverse-Payment                          
Settlement Problem 
The government should be empowered to assume its proper role in 
advocating for consumers. In response to this regulatory mismatch, Con-
gress should empower a regulatory agency—potentially the FTC—to 
bring patent invalidity suits directly. Currently, the U.S. government may 
not bring a patent validity suit unless an antitrust violation has been 
found and patent validity relates to relief.201 
The key precedent to this doctrine is United States v. Glaxo Group, 
Ltd.202 Here, the Supreme Court ruled that the Government could bring a 
patent validity suit after it had proven that the parties committed an anti-
trust violation if the relief in the case was related to patent validity.203 In 
Glaxo, the Government brought and won an antitrust suit against a phar-
maceutical patent holder for its anticompetitive licensing of its patented 
drug.204 Along with the antitrust suit, the Government brought a patent 
invalidity suit against the patent holder.205 But the lower court “struck the 
claims of patent validity from the Government’s complaint.”206 The Su-
                                                                                                                                     
In closing, it is worth emphasizing that what the FTC proposes is that we attempt to de-
cide how some other court in some other case at some other time was likely to have re-
solved some other claim if it had been pursued to judgment. If we did that we would be 
deciding a patent case within an antitrust case about the settlement of the patent case, a 
turducken task. 
Id. 
 201. See, e.g., United States v. Glaxo Group, Ltd., 410 U.S. 52 (1973). 
[The Court] think[s] it would have been appropriate, if it appeared that the Government’s 
[antitrust] claims for further relief were substantial, for the court to have also entertained 
the Government’s challenge to the validity of those patents. In arriving at this conclusion, 
we do not recognize unlimited authority in the Government to attack a patent by basing 
an antitrust claim on the simple assertion that the patent is invalid. 
Id. at 59. 
 202. Id. 
 203. Id. at 59. 
 204. Id. at 56. 
 205. Id. 
 206. Id. 
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preme Court remanded for consideration in part because “[i]t is as im-
portant to the public that competition should not be repressed by worth-
less patents, as that the patentee of a really valuable invention should be 
protected in his monopoly.”207 
A proposed legislative amendment, in the spirit of Glaxo, may 
solve the reverse-payment settlement problem. A reverse-payment set-
tlement may be an indicator that a patent would be found invalid. Legis-
lators should take the patent’s potential invalidity and antitrust implica-
tions seriously, particularly in light of the outside-the-scope settlements 
that occurred early in Paragraph IV litigations. 
To enable the government to act, this Comment proposes the fol-
lowing amendment, which has two main goals.208 First, the amendment 
gives the government standing to litigate invalidity suits after a reverse-
payment settlement has occurred. Second, assuming that the patent is 
found invalid, the amendment creates a rebuttable presumption that an 
antitrust violation occurred. 
 
The proposed amendment: 
 
(a) Standing. The Federal Trade Commission [or another agency] 
shall have standing to sue a NDA holder to determine patent 
validity if: 
(i) an ANDA filer receives anything of value from a NDA 
holder; 
(ii) the ANDA filer agrees to limit or forego research, de-
velopment, manufacturing, marketing, or sales of the 
ANDA product for any period of time; and 
(iii) what is received by the ANDA filer in (i) is valued over 
seven million USD. 
 
(b) Infringement. If (a) is satisfied, then the infringement require-
ments in the Patent Act are also satisfied. 
 
(c) Antitrust Presumption. If any suit is instigated under section (a) 
and the patent involved is found to be invalid, then: 
                                                            
 207. Id. at 58 (citing Pope Mfg. Co. v. Cormully, 144 U.S. 224, 234 (1892)). 
 208. The language of this proposed amendment is substantially taken from the language in 
Senate Bill 214, but the legislation outlined here functions differently. See generally S. 214, 113th 
Cong. (1st Sess. 2013). The proposed legislation bifurcates the reverse settlement suit into a patent 
invalidity suit and a subsequent antitrust challenge contingent on finding the patent invalid. 
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(i) antitrust suit(s) may be instigated against the ANDA fil-
er or the NDA holder by the Federal Trade Commission 
[or another agency]; and 
(ii) the exchange described in section (a) shall be presumed 
to be anticompetitive behavior, placing the burden on the 
ANDA filer and the NDA holder. 
 
(d) Competitive Factors. In determining whether the parties to the 
original settlement can overcome the presumption that antitrust 
violations occurred under section (c), the fact finder shall con-
sider: 
(i) the length of time remaining at the time of settlement, 
until the end of the life of the relevant patent, compared 
with the agreed upon entry date for the ANDA product; 
(ii) the value to consumers of the competition from the 
ANDA product allowed under the agreement; 
(iii) the form and amount of consideration received by the 
ANDA filer in the agreement resolving or settling the 
patent infringement claim; 
(iv) the revenue the ANDA filer would have received by 
winning the patent litigation; 
(v) the reduction in the NDA holder’s revenues if it had lost 
the patent litigation; 
(vi) the type of underlying patent involved; 
(vii) the time period between the date of the agreement con-
veying value to the ANDA filer and the date of the set-
tlement of the patent infringement claim; and 
(viii) any other factor that the fact finder, in its discretion, 
deems relevant to its determination of competitive ef-
fects under this subsection. 
 
(e) Penalties. 
(i) Each person, partnership, or corporation that violates or 
assists in the violation of this section shall forfeit and 
pay to the United States a civil penalty sufficient to deter 
violations of this section, but in no event shall the penal-
ty be greater than three times the value received by the 
party that is reasonably attributable to a violation of this 
section. If no such value has been received by the NDA 
holder, the penalty to the NDA holder shall be sufficient 
to deter violations, but in no event shall the penalty be 
greater than three times the value given to the ANDA 
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filer reasonably attributable to the violation of this sec-
tion. Such penalty shall accrue to the United States and 
may be recovered in a civil action brought by the Federal 
Trade Commission [or another agency], in its own name 
by any of its attorneys designated by it for such purpose, 
in a district court of the United States against any per-
son, partnership, or corporation that violates this section. 
In such actions, the United States district courts are em-
powered to grant mandatory injunctions and such other 
and further equitable relief as they deem appropriate. 
(ii) Civil penalty. In determining the amount of the civil 
penalty described in this section, the court shall take into 
account: 
(A) the nature, circumstances, extent, and gravity of 
the violation; 
(B) with respect to the violator, the degree of culpa-
bility, any history of violations, the ability to 
pay, any effect on the ability to continue doing 
business, profits earned by the NDA holder, 
compensation received by the ANDA filer, and 
the amount of commerce affected; and 
(C) other matters that justice requires. 
 
(f) Definitions. 
(i) ANDA. The term “ANDA” means 
an abbreviated new drug application, as defined under 
section 505(j) of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic 
Act (21 U.S.C. 355(j)). 
(iii) ANDA filer. The term “ANDA filer” means a party who 
has filed an ANDA with the Food and Drug Administra-
tion. 
(iv) NDA. The term “NDA” means a new drug application, 
as defined under section 505(b) of the Federal Food, 
Drug, and Cosmetic Act (21 U.S.C. 355(b)). 
(v) NDA holder. The term “NDA holder” means: 
(A) the party that received FDA approval to market 
a drug product pursuant to an NDA; 
(B) a party owning or controlling enforcement of the 
patent listed in the Approved Drug Products 
With Therapeutic Equivalence Evaluations 
(commonly known as the “FDA Orange Book”) 
in connection with the NDA; or 
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(C) the predecessors, subsidiaries, divisions, groups, 
and affiliates controlled by, controlling, or under 
common control with any of the entities de-
scribed in subparagraphs (A) and (B) (such con-
trol to be presumed by direct or indirect share 
ownership of 50% or greater), as well as the li-
censees, licensors, successors, and assigns of 
each of the entities. 
 
If Congress enacts this proposed amendment, the new law would 
(1) align consumer interests to the party of the patent invalidity suit, es-
sentially effectuating the original goal of the Hatch–Waxman structure; 
(2) empower the regulatory agency that monitors reverse payment set-
tlements with the ability to prioritize which settlements seem to be pro-
tecting weak patents; (3) create a disincentive for generic drug producers 
to protect particularly weak patents along with patent holders; (4) break 
the potential for a code of silence amongst insiders; (5) have less de-
pendence on the slow-moving decisions of the federal courts; (6) antici-
pate future issues with sham consideration; and (7) in some cases, elimi-
nate the need to decide a patent case within an antitrust case by properly 
dividing the suit into stages to the benefit of consumers. 
One of the government’s unique roles is to protect citizens in situa-
tions where they cannot protect themselves—when citizens are externali-
ties. By contrast, this is neither the role nor the expectation of private 
actors or businesses. In the case of the Hatch–Waxman Act, the govern-
ment tried to turn private actors into proxies for consumers, but the ap-
plication of the Act fell short of expectations. Still, the Act and the 
FTC’s monitoring succeeded in discovering when these potentially anti-
competitive agreements have been made. In light of the generic drug 
producer’s potentially anticompetitive actions, it would not make sense 
to further delegate litigation to the private actors. 
Instead, Congress should empower a government agency to exer-
cise its discretion in bringing suits. This Comment proposes granting this 
ability to the FTC because it has spearheaded monitoring and scrutiny of 
reverse payment settlements thus far.209 Thus, the agency already has 
practice at targeting suspicious reverse payments. The FTC is uniquely 
situated to exercise its discretionary power to bring invalidity suits. But 
ultimately, it does not matter which agency fulfills this role as long as it 
                                                            
 209. See, e.g., Feinstein, supra note 17, at 1–2. 
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is empowered to invalidate weak patents and prevent antitrust violations 
when reverse payment settlements occur. 
Although generic drug producers may have colluded to help hide 
anticompetitive and weak patents, sufficiently high antitrust violation 
damages might deter generic drug producers from settling in future 
Hatch–Waxman litigation. By settling, the generic companies received 
significant benefits without exposing themselves to much risk. Because 
of reverse payment settlements, generic companies have been able to 
make higher profits by doing nothing, rather than by actually creating 
generic drugs.210 If the proposed legislation was enacted, the generic pro-
ducers would risk as much as they gain if they were eventually found to 
have wrongfully colluded in reverse payment settlements. This deterrent 
would help realign the generic companies’ interests with the public. 
At a minimum, the new legislation would divide the private inter-
ests, which could break the potential silence between insiders. While it 
might be impossible to convince the patent holders that they can benefit 
from invalidity and competition, it is possible to convince generic pro-
ducers that they can benefit from off-patent drugs. The proposed 
amendment would re-divide the private interests and prevent the anti-
competitive settlements between the parties. Furthermore, the bright-line 
settlement amount would allow both companies to plan and decide the 
relative strength of their suit. It would provide an incentive to settle early 
if the generic did not have a strong suit, and it would provide an incen-
tive against settling if the generic producer expected to gain more than $7 
million net profit from producing the drug. This ability to plan around 
these incentives may keep these expensive patent and antitrust suits from 
clogging the courts with litigation. Thus, the legislation would also pro-
mote efficiency with regard to the courts. 
The proposed amendment would formalize the goals of Congress 
such that the judiciary would not need to legislate from the bench. The 
decision in Actavis to apply the full rule of reason analysis arose to re-
spond to the unique and unanticipated problems of reverse payment set-
tlements. Furthermore, the decision in Actavis came ten years after the 
first Paragraph IV reverse settlements were litigated. 211  This slow-
moving and backward-looking approach is not nimble enough to address 
the remaining problems with reverse-payments settlements.212 Unlike the 
ultimate ruling in the courts, a legislative amendment would clarify and 
                                                            
 210. See supra note 60. 
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solidify the government’s expectations of the pharmaceutical patent 
holders and the generic companies. Also, because of the relative compe-
tencies of the legislature, it can address a broader scope of issues than the 
judiciary and actively advocate for the consumer–public interest by in-
validating weak patents. 
The amendment would also address the concerns of the Watson 
court in regard to deciding a patent case within an antitrust case—the 
turducken task.213 First, the amendment intentionally stages litigation to 
consider validity before addressing whether antitrust violations occurred. 
In the first stage of litigation, the presumption of validity remains with 
the patent holder to satisfy the rights of the patent holder. The amend-
ment only modifies the government’s ability to bring a cause of action. 
Second, it is not a general grant of standing to the government. The 
agency would only be able to bring invalidity suits when a sufficiently 
large reverse-payment settlement occurs. Thus, the government would 
not have the unchecked ability to challenge pharmaceutical patents. 
Third, the government could win or lose this cause of action. If the gov-
ernment lost, then the matter would end. If the government won, the pa-
tent holder would still be able to defend itself from antitrust litigation and 
have the chance to prove the validity of the suit after the initial presump-
tion had been satisfied. Lastly, the decision of the agency to move on and 
litigate the antitrust suit is also discretionary. If the patent was weak, then 
the agency could choose to proceed; but if the decision was close and the 
validity of the patent was a hard question, then the agency may opt to 
stop at finding the patent invalid. The shift in presumption in the second 
suit would allow the parties to defend the reasonableness of the patent 
claim, and any pro-competitive reasons for the reverse-payment settle-
ment would make antitrust damages not necessarily a foregone conclu-
sion. 
Furthermore, the creation of stages within the litigation mirrors 
Congress’s goals in creating the Hatch–Waxman Act. The Act was creat-
ed to facilitate the entry of generics into the pharmaceutical market and 
get lower priced drugs to consumers.214 In the proposed legislation, the 
government agency would be empowered to effectively complete the suit 
that the generic producer initiated. Regardless of how a patent might be 
invalidated, consumers will benefit if the patent monopoly is broken. If 
the agency feels that there was wrongdoing on the part of the parties to 
the settlement—that the agreement was an anticompetitive attempt to 
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exercise a limited monopoly—then the government can pursue an anti-
trust suit against the settlement parties. Thus, in descending order of im-
portance, the priorities effectuated are first to benefit the public through 
generic entry, and second to punish and deter anticompetitive behavior. 
In the end, providing a cause of action to a government agency bet-
ter aligns the roles of the Executive Branch and the Judicial Branch in 
relation to reverse payment settlements. The Executive Branch’s role is 
to effectuate the intended policies of Congress and protect the public 
through the execution of such laws. The proper role of the Judicial 
Branch is to act as a neutral arbiter between parties in conflict. Here, 
public and private interests are in conflict, and the decision of the Su-
preme Court in Actavis did not presumptively favor the private interests 
through the scope of the patent test, nor did it favor the public interests 
through the FTC test. Furthermore, the Actavis decision failed to provide 
clear guidance on how to apply the full rule of reason analysis. The first 
two options were not sufficiently neutral, and the final option left the 
private parties and the FTC unsure of how to conform their actions to the 
law. 
Meanwhile, the proposed amendment would empower the govern-
ment agency to act in a limited way. It would give guidance to private 
actors about how to conform their behavior because of the clear bright-
line expectations within the amendment. And it would allow the court to 
maintain its proper role as a neutral arbiter when the interests of public 
and private actors come into conflict. 
C. Response to Anticipated Criticism of the Proposed Legislation 
Just as the Hatch–Waxman Act has been criticized since its enact-
ment, the proposed amendment will inevitably be criticized as imperfect 
as well. In an attempt to advocate for its enactment, this section address-
es anticipated criticism of the proposed legislation. First, this section ad-
dresses concerns about how this action may harm innovation. Second, 
this section considers the practical consequences of the proposed litiga-
tion upon Paragraph IV filers. 
First, the strongest policy defense of patent holders’ rights to a mo-
nopoly is that those monopolies fund future innovation. While this is 
true, the patent holder should only be protected so far as it is actually 
innovating. As the court in Glaxo noted, “It is as important to the public 
that competition should not be repressed by worthless patents, as that the 
patentee of a really valuable invention should be protected in his monop-
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oly. . . .”215 Non-innovative patents do not serve innovation. Patents that 
are found invalid under the proposed legislation should logically be 
deemed fatally weak. Furthermore, under the proposed legislation the 
patent holder maintains its presumption of validity throughout the inva-
lidity suit. Thus, the rights of a patent holder are maintained, but only 
protected so long as the new product is actually innovative. 
The proposed litigation may also be criticized as a deterrent to liti-
gation under Paragraph IV of the Hatch–Waxman Act, but this is the 
tradeoff that reverse payment settlements require. Generic producers may 
be more hesitant to file Paragraph IV ANDAs because patent holders 
may attempt to drive the cost above $7 million to make the decision eco-
nomically unsound. But this is the price of creating a bright-line rule. 
Generic producers who still believe that they may benefit more from fil-
ing than the company might lose by litigating the case will be able to 
make self-interested choices with clear fiscal margins in mind. The Act 
was created to facilitate generic drug entry; it was not created to give the 
generic companies leverage so that pharmaceutical patent holders would 
pay them to help protect their patents’ validity.216 
Critics may suggest that the high costs of litigation would be a bur-
den on the government in a time when federal funding is already limited. 
But the treble damages and the benefits to other government goals and 
programs will more than compensate the government and the consumers 
for the cost of litigating the patent validity or antitrust suits. The gov-
ernment is on many sides of this issue. Congress negotiated the Hatch–
Waxman Act and would enact any future legislation. The FTC spear-
headed the fight against the antitrust violations in reverse payment set-
tlements. And the government is also a consumer in that it subsidizes 
medical care. These considerations should quell complaints that the gov-
ernment is spending money on litigation because of how many goals are 
accomplished through the litigation of fatally weak patents. 
Admittedly, the proposed solution places most of the cost upon the 
pharmaceutical patent holder, but the property rights of the patent hold-
ers are not being arbitrarily challenged. Under the proposed legislation, 
there is a threshold requirement of a suspicious reverse-payment deal 
prior to FTC validity challenges. Patent holders may suggest that this 
will create unfair costs to the patent holders, but it seems reasonable for 
the patent holder to defend the patent’s validity in court for such a lucra-
tive benefit. Perhaps the Hatch–Waxman Act and this amendment will 
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decrease the profit margins of the pharmaceutical patent holders, but the 
historical expectations of profitability are partially based on the limited 
challenges to invalidity and criticized extension of monopolies beyond 
the patent term. The natural result of Congress’s corrective action may be 
that the profits to the industry would shrink. Relevant questions include 
the following: Do the profit margins deserve to shrink? Was the high 
profitability of the pharmaceutical industry partially based on illegiti-
mate, anticompetitive practices? If so, then Congress should continue to 
legislate so that private actors do not benefit wrongfully off of the legiti-
mately earned wages of the public at large. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court took over a decade to grant certiorari on a re-
verse settlement payment case. During that time, consumers may have 
lost billions of dollars due to reverse payment settlements. Congress 
should not allow the powerful self-interest of pharmaceutical patent 
holders to go unchecked. Although Congress created a uniquely litigious 
regulatory scheme in the Hatch–Waxman Act, this is not an excuse for 
private parties or the government to allow antitrust violations to be be-
yond review. It is true that we do not know if antitrust violations oc-
curred or if the patents are invalid. But, if the government allows poten-
tial anticompetitive settlements to persist unquestioned, it would fail in 
its role of advocating for the interest of the consumers. 
For these reasons, Congress should enact legislation that targets the 
source of the reverse-payment settlement problem: weak patent validity. 
The proposed legislation is not a sweeping standard that would allow the 
FTC to litigate in any circumstance. Rather, the language limits the scope 
of the standing granted to the specific context where the actions of the 
private parties indicate that anticompetitive behavior may have occurred. 
This has the added benefits of allowing the FTC to regulate the potential-
ly anticompetitive behavior—reverse payment settlements—while simul-
taneously giving the private actors notice that the settlements may trigger 
a patent invalidity suit. Providing notice to the private actors allows them 
to plan in such a way so as to avoid litigation, or risk the FTC exercising 
its discretion to litigate. 
Legislation is preferable to the decision of the Supreme Court in 
Actavis because the Court did not suggest that the FTC challenge the va-
lidity of a patent; now, only Congress can. Patent validity is the heart of 
the reverse-payment settlement problem. Pharmaceutical patent holders 
are not fighting for their right to settle Paragraph IV litigation, but to pro-
tect their patents’ validity. The Hatch–Waxman Act was not created to 
force patent holders and generics into litigation, but to facilitate generic 
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market entry by invalidating weak patents. Antitrust damages will not 
benefit consumers, but invalidating weak patents that drive up consumer 
costs will. In the end, litigating the patents is the solution to the actual 
problem: fatally weak pharmaceutical patents. 
 
